Comments on life, science, business, philosophy, and religion from my personal public health viewpoint
Monday, April 23, 2007
capstone presentation index
Welcome! This is a "work in progress" and comments are welcome. Follow the links below, or just go to the relevant slide and add your comment below it.
Or, e-mail me (see last slide) if you'd like to chat or have me include references to your own work here.
Here's an index to the slides that follow, because they will get spread out after people add comments.
1) Title page
2) photo of the author (me)
3) the problem of diabetes
4) NIH grant link
5) Wagner's Chronic Care model
6) Evolution of computing - and computing driven evolution
7) theories of behavior change
8) Personal Health Records arrive
9) two different PHR agendas
10) redefining the problem to solve
11) what would results look like?
12) prior data - Cho, 2006, Korea
13) prior data - O'Connor 2005 EMR
14) tentative proposal part A
15) tentative proposal part B
16) the universal feedback control pattern
17) wayfinding questions for the team
18) smart process control chart for teams
19) the "blue gozinta"
20) refocus - first pass design
21) grant development next iteration
22) take home messages
23) great free collaboration tools at 37signals
24) reflexive link and MC Escher strange loops
25) credits, and author e-mail
capstone slide 2
My Quantitative Biomedical home-page.
My web logs:
Perspectives in Public Health
Systems Thinking in Public Health
Other links:
Intelligent Agent Infrastructures For Supporting Collaborative Work (Sen, Durfee, and Schuette, 1995 - Computer Science and Engineering graduate project, EECS department, University of Michigan)
Evaluation of Blogger. Ching-I Chang. Narayan Kansal. Younah Kang. Wade Schuette. SI 689 (Computer-supported Coooperative Work, UM School of Information graduate program Group Project. December 13, 2005. )
Evaluation of Blogger - powerpoint presentation.
Biographic:
I inherited my interest in computing from my uncle, Roger Schuette, who is shown in slide 6 in a publicity photo from 1952 (roughly), which shows the computer his team had just designed and built at the Barber-Coleman Company in Rockford Illinois. Unfortunately, Howard Coleman's genius at invention wasn't matched with his insight into business, and the company decided these "computers" had too many bugs to ever amount to much, and sold their patents to other companies, such as, I think, IBM.
In any case, I built my own first analog computer, from a kit, in 1956 - it played Tic-Tac-Toe and would always either beat you or tie the game, depending on who went first. I was trained in the language "1401 Autocoder" at IBM in Cleveland, Ohio, in1965 while working for the Thompson Ramo Woldridge company, which became today's TRW.
In 1976, I got my MBA and joined a team at the New York State College of Veterinary Medicine and the NYS Diagnostic Laboratory that copied the Electronic Medical Record system developed by G. Octo Barnett at Massachusetts General Hospital, written in a new language called MUMPS, and converted it to handle multiple species. The work was led by John Lewkowicz, (The Complete MUMPS: An Introduction and Reference Manual for the MUMPS Programming Language, John Lewkowicz) , and was part of what led ultimately to the current largest medical records system in the USA, the Veterans Administration system VistA. (Veterans Health Information Systems and Information Architecture, with a name that precedes Microsoft's use of the name for their own operating system, no relation.)
We had the animal hospital up with sub-second response time, 80 functions - admissions, discharge, billing, histopathology slide indexing, decision-support for medication orders, etc. - fully implemented in 1976.
In 1976, we all thought that human hospitals were going to be just a few years behind us in putting in Electronic Medical Records systems. Given 30 years perspective, I think that was optimistic.
My major lesson, however, is that "There is no such thing as a technical problem." The technology to build entire EMR systems has been available for 30 years. The designs are freely available from the VA system, or from the state-run national health service in the Netherlands, to name two. The impedance, reluctance, resistance to implementation of such systems is not due to money, because we did the whole thing in 2.5 years with a team of 5 people, technically.
The issues hospitals have are psychosocial issues, often perceived as "political" issues, or discovered with shock and awe by yet another technical team as "implementation" or "acceptance" issues, which were mistakenly thought to be "minor issues" or "bumps in the road to be dealt with as they arose, at the end of the project."
After 30 years watching this field, I'd go the other way and say these are psychosocial issues and the technology is the trivial part. A standard laptop today has more computing power than we used to run an entire hospital system in 1976, or than the Netherlands uses to run a gigantic 2,500 bed hospital with sub-second response time. (in 1989 at SCAMC in San Francisco I had lunch with their chief developer - they were running a hospital on one "MicroVAX", with a second one as a hot-spare, and power left over. Of course, they had to rewrite the operating system to do it...)
Of course, no technology group wants to "hear" the message that the shoals they are crashing on are social in nature and that their whole concept needs to be rethought. The good news is that there is a growing body of expertise, in places such as the School of Information at the University of Michigan, in "social computing" - now an official graduate major at UM, which has a 30 year background in "Technology-Mediated Collaboration".
The design features of collaborative software are so different from those of single-user software, such as a spread sheet or word processor, that the old insights about software design and evaluation are worse than valueless - they actually lead you down the wrong pathways. Software that looks great when one person tests it in isolation, and has a good "human interface" (for 1 human) can still have a wretched "multi-human interface" behavior.
The national CCHIT approval process for medical record systems doesn't even begin to assess this level of this multi-level problem, but you can be sure that the hospital staff will experience that level and respond to it. You can also be confident that, if this level wasn't consciously and explicity well-designed, that it will be somewhere between poorly-designed and pathologically designed.
And, it's rather hard to design such a system without substantial interaction with and feedback from the entire contemplated user community.
The odds that an off-the-shelf system can be simply dropped into an unprepared hospital setting and "take" are low, regardless how strongly this is desired or mandated from above, or promised by the vendor. In fact, there may be an inverse relationship between how much the system is seen as imposed from above ("take it or leave") and social acceptance of the corresonding cultural change that is required to readjust to that technology. As Public Health has learned repeatedly, outside interventions that are not culturally-sensitive, dropped from a speeding helicopter in local villages, tend to be barely tolerated with false smiles during implementation, then die a rapid death as soon as the implementation team leaves.
We'll have a sense that this concept is finally understood when we see EMR development teams start with the idea of social acceptance of this new paradigm (electronic collaboration), and when the planning team includes social psychologists, cultural anthropologists, and people from the Information Sciences. If the problem is perceived as simply "electronic records", that is, as one related to databases and messaging tasks, and human beings interacting are not prominantely featured on any of the architecture diagrams, then the odds are against success of the project. There will be large-scale social "tissue rejection" of the kind that Public Health has encountered routinely so much for decades, in response to which Public Health has developed the ecological model, "PRECEDE/PROCEED", etc. (See Health Program Planning - An Educational and Ecological Approach ed., by Lawrence W. Green and Marshall W. , 4thKreuter, McGraw-Hill, (c) 2005 - 1st ed (c) 1961.)
So, it's not that the solution to such problems are unknown - they are just not part of the "Information Technolgy" literature, but are instead over in the "Public Health" literature, and the two have very little cross-talk. This is where there is a pressing need for Public Heath Informatics to step in and take a lead getting these disparate groups to talk to each other.
Later I'll also recommend that Public Health Informatics may be required to cross the bridge between the "feedback control problem" that public health keeps crashing into, and the "feedback control solutions" that Control System Engineering has mastered, off in a different universe that again has no cross-talk in the literature.
capstone slide 4
NIH grant announcement PA-06-337 (an R21)
NIH New Investigator's Guide
Also, of potential interest, is the funding opportunity announcement from the CDC in REACH - Racial and Ethnic Approaches to Community Health - although the closing date for that is May 7, 2007.
The REACH Detroit Partnership is of the most interest to me for future work and collaboration, as it is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and is supported by the University of Michigan School of Public Health and the UM School of Social Work and a number of local health systems such as Henry Ford.
Reach also has a "New Internet Computer" (NIC) initiative to explore low-cost web-based empowerment strategies. Bill Gates recently came out in favor of cell-phones as the way to go for the poor. On that subject, Gates also just gave $25,000,000 to Cornell University to develop a program in "systems thinking", a subject relevant to this presentation. Obviously, along with other Gates Foundation initiatives in TB control, etc., Gates thinks this is an important direction to explore.
capstone slide 5
Ed Wagner's Institute for Healthcare Improvement Chronic Care Model
As an afterthought, maybe this is not the best place to start from.
The CDC has a REACH program - Racial and Ethnic Approaches to Community Health -- Finding Solutions to Health Disparities 2007.
Within that is the program REACH Detroit Partnership.
Also, of potential interest, is the funding opportunity announcement from the CDC in this field although the closing date, May 7, 2007 is 6 days after this presentation is scheduled and might be a tad hard to reach.
The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health new department of Health, Behavior, and Society also represents the new way of looking at chronic care and lifestyle problems.
The 2006 Johns Hopkins Public Health Magazine on-line has an article "reach out to immigrants" with links to work being done at Hopkins in this area.
There are 20 or so 1-page articles there on "Urban Health" and all of them are relevant to this presentation and appear to me to be fully consistent with what I am suggesting here - so while my direction may be at odds with Wagner, it is aligned with Hopkins.
Also, the idea of using cell-phones to manage diabetes is not one of my own innovations. In fact, a recent JHU Division of Health Science Informatics seminar at Johns Hopkins was on a private company that is doing just that in Baltimore:
=============================================
February 23, 2007 10:45
Managing Diabetes by Cellphone
Suzanne Sysko, M.D., James Minor, Ph.D and Ryan Sysko (WellDoc)
***NO WEBCAST/VIDEO***
welldoc-communications
The technology link is clear to me, and under the covers the software is sophisticated (judging from their want-ads for software engineers), and I assume they are building an electronic record behind all that, but I don't know to what extent they are looking at team or group activities and using the phone as a collaboration tool, not a wireless data-processing device, and to what extent the patient is empowered, versus a data-entry clerk.
Those distinctions are the important innovative ones that this Capstone analysis contributes to the mix -- getting past using technology as a data-processing tool and looking to "technology-mediated collaboration" as the fertile ground for exploration and progress.
The focus has to be on the collaboration end, not on the technology end, to get this design to work, however -- making it very distinct from the approach most Electronic Health Record, or EMR, or PHR, or CPOE, or even the whole National Health Information Infrastructure is heading, which I think needs adjusting.
Lee Green, M.D., M.P.H., Professor and Associate Chair for Information Management int he Department of Family Medicine at the University of Michigan Medical School gave a seminar last week (Health Informatics Grand Rounds, April 18, 2007, contact health.information.grand.rounds@umich.edu) titled "Electronic Health Records: Solutions to the Right Problems?" where he similarly challenged the growing focus on a Computerized Physician Order Entry system as being the Holy Grail, saying "[EHRs] fare poorly at supporting system-based care, translation of evidence into practice, and quality improvement despite widespread belief in academic and policy circles that they provide these functions." A PR piece on Lee Green and type-2 diabetes is here.
It is important to note that I am not opposed to electronic health records or CPOE systems, provided they are designed with collaboration as the central design pillar, not an afterthought tacked on at the end. The technology for decent EMR's and CPOE with decision support has been around for over 30 years -- which I'm sure of because I was on a team that successfully ported Mass General's medical record system, in MUMPS, to multi-species use and put up 200 on-line terminals with sub-second response time in 1976 at Cornell University's Vet School, under the direction of John Lewkowitz.
ALL of the delays and obstacles since that time in human hospitals becoming similarly empowered have to be laid the doorstep of the social end of the socio-technology solution. That's why I'm so confident that solving technical problems of "interoperability" will not magically open the door to a flood of improved medical care.To quote T.S. Eliot, my favorite author, who I notice is also quoted by the Software Engineering Institute's staff: T. S. Eliot noted, in Choruses from The Rock (1934):
They constantly try to escapeAfter watching this field for 40 years, I am increasingly convinced that the core problems in the way of good medical care, and good health care, are spiritual problems, not technical problems. We have the technology, and have had it for 30 years. That is not the problem, and twiddling with it is not going to fix the problem.
From the darkness outside and within
By dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good.
But the man that is shall shadow
The man that pretends to be.
We treat each other poorly, and that needs to be fixed. Then, the technology will matter. Until then, looking to technology for "solutions" will only rotate the problem and burn time and money and lives while Rome burns.
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capstone slide 6
Note: To really appreciate what you can get on a "mobile-phone" now, take a look at Yahoo's new "Go" service and their video tour.
Changes:
* Tremendous reduction in size, increase in power.
* Much nicer packaging - now "wearable" and wireless
* Change from "do computations" to "support collaboration"
At the same time
* supercomputers went from 1 big box to an interconnected grid of thousands of small boxes - because it works better
* programs to solve very hard problems went from 1 huge program with very complex logic to thousands of collaborating rules or sub-programs - because it works better and, in fact, can learn to solve problems that the program author could not!
* Artificial intelligence went from a huge complex logic to thousands of small rules, for the same reason -- because it works better.
* It's not just a box, you're talking to the world on the web
* It's not just the web, it's "Web-2" -- you don't just read it, you can write it as well, like Wikipedia.
* This has changed tremendously in the last 5 years. Time to update your concept of what "computing" and "informatics" is about.
* The key is "technology mediated collaboration" not "databases" or "communication" or "computerized physician order entry systems" or "electronic health records" or even "personal health records."
These are no longer "shared data storage and retrieval" systems where the problem is indexing and maybe a little, annoying "decision-support" is included but typically shut off because it is annoying.
These are "collaborative decision-making systems" where ease of successful collaboration is the first and primary objective, and the "patient" is the one running the show and collaborating with his or her support network.
That network includes clinical caregivers as just one minor component. Mostly, this is about a person managing her life, not about a doctor managing patient visits and reimbursement coding.
* University of Michigan School of Information now offers the world's first graduate course in "Social Computing" this year.
The man proudly demonstrating his computer in the year 1952 in the picture above the left is Roger Schuette, my uncle. (see slide 2 for more info). Here's a December 2006 article that mentions him from the Rockford Register Star, Dec 14, 2006.
And here's the detail blown up to be readable.
..
capstone slide 7
McGreggor's Theory X and Theory Y reference will go [here].
Barbara Fredrickson's Positive Psychology reference will go [here].
Discussion of High-Reliability Organizations and the role of mindfulness (Karl Weick, Patient Safety and Peter Pronovost, Threat and Errror Management, etc.) goes [here] and all have links to the literature at the bottom of this post.
Discussion of Institute of Medicine's MICROSYSTEMS and references (below) goes [here]
Role of integrity, honesty, and virtue in all of the above: see my early post Virtue drives the bottom line with many links at the end to such literature. (excuse the formatting near the top of that post - it fights back.)
Discussion of authority structure versus open structure trade-offs in agility
and ability to react rapidly in a crisis goes here. Compare Oxford University's inability after 1,100 years to agree on a mail system to FedEx ability to turn on a dime. When is there "too much" collegiality? When does a "crisis" justify over-riding "personal liberty" in the interests of "national security" for "the duration of this crisis" and how has that played out all the last 20 times it was tried?
The Current US Army solution - Leadership Doctrine (Basically theory xYx', "ex-why-ex-primed"). Same as Karl Weick's fire-fighter solution. Theory Y during peacetime as establish valid command channels, with theory X (informed eyes open) during a crisis, (the exact opposite of FEMA during Katrina). See US Army Leadership Field Manual FM22-100
and What relates Public Health and the US Army?
Same problem that hospitals have - how to keep CONTROL OF THE MISSION, not have substantial loss-of-life during the learning period, and yet otherwise keep the structure open, flexible, agile, responsive to the environment, eyes-open, and a cybernetic "unit" - which is the "unity amid diversity", the "e pluribus unum", the "specialization and reintegration", the "silos and single system" and the core problem of "democracy" and "corporate governance and decision-making."
Key - whatever else happens, you can't violate:
* the laws of thermodynamics
* the laws of cybernetics and control system engineering
Which says this: if there is not a COMPLETE LOOP between the bottom and the top, that allows commands to flow downward and NEW, surprising, model-changing DATA to flow upwards, it will crash and burn.Also, as shown in FEMA, in any organization it is ultimately fatal to use a "star" architecture and have all decisions made "at the top", especially in a crisis. The model that works, and worked in Katrina, was the Coast Guard, where decision-making had already been delegated downward to each ship's captain who had authority to take sensible action on their own in a crisis, particuarly if communications with "the top" were cut off. So, if the top is functioning, listen to the top ("x"), if it's not, listen to own judgement "Y", but judgment that has been formed by previously listening to the top that, in turn, had been actively and adequately listening to the troops at the front "x-prime", which gets me model xYx' .
In any true crisis, the top command will be completely preoccupied with a few huge questions and 100% unresponsive to "small problems" from the front, so, as in New Orleans, the guys at the front will be "on their own" anyway, cut off from communications with the top - or, more precisely, it doesn't matter if the phone lines are up, because no one there will be answering the phones - they're all off in a meeting deciding something of cosmic importance and can't be bothered to take your call.So you better have an action-based method that doesn't depend on the "top" being useful at all during a crisis,which means you better practice that most of the time so you get good at it, which means that Microsystems need to get by on their own anyway.
Interestingly enough, the human body delegates as much as possible downwards. It's not actually possible to touch-type, as I am doing at this second, under brain "control", because it takes 100 milliseconds for the neural impulse to go round trip from the finger to the brain and back, and the inter-key interval is often down to 15 milliseconds.
So, with 100% certainty, we can predict that the "control" exercised must be a more general "feed forward" control, which I need to have a link to [here]. In any case the whole concept of "time" and "causality" becomes smeared out in a multi-pass feedback loop with phase-locking, which means that the directions "forwards" and "backwards" lose their typical meaning, and every loop becomes an M.C. Esher staircase or a Richard Hofsteader's "Strange loop" (Esher, Godel, and Bach) where "up" and "down" take you to the same place and non-transitive links are the norm, not the exception. (link needs to go [here]).
========================
References and further reading
High-Relability Organizations and asking for help
Secrets of High-Reliability Organizations (in depth, academic paper)
High-Reliability.org web site
Threat and Error Management - aviation and hospital safety
Failure is perhaps our most taboo subject (link to John Gall Systemantics)
Houston - we have another problem (on complexity and limits of one person's mind)
Institute of Medicine - Crossing the Quality Chasm and microsystems (small group teamwork)
Pathways to Peace - beautiful slides and reflections to music on the value of virtues
A User's Manual for the IOM's 'Quality Chasm' ReportBerwick
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/21/3/80.pdf
Executive Summary for Health Care Leaders
Microsystems in Health Care
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Dartmouth
Microsystems in Health Care, part 2:
Creating a Rich Information Environment
Joint Commission Journal of Quality and Safety
IOM's "Executive summary
Entire IOM "Crossing the Quality Chasm" book (readable on-line)
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10027.html#toc
University of Michigan School of Information "Alliance for Community Technology".
The mission of the Alliance for Community Technology (ACT) is to lead in advancing the use of computing and communication technology globally to serve people (to help people help themselves) through community serving organizations. It is committed to a human-centered focus on the creation, use, understanding, training and dissemination of appropriate technologies to support communities whether these communities are defined by geography, organizational structure or common interest (i.e. whether they are defined physically or conceptually).It will focus particularly on disadvantaged communities. ...
capstone slide 8
A good place to start learning about PHR's is the joint site for AHIMA and HIMSS: myPHR
As that site notes "The American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA) demonstrated its advocacy for the empowerment of individuals to manage their healthcare by issuing a joint Position Statement for Consumers of Health Care on the Value of Personal Health Records with the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) in February 2007."
The US Department of Health and Human Services has a much longer formal report in pdf format on PHR's, Personal Health Records and Personal Health Record Systems.
Wikipedia, not an authoritative source but often with more current links than other sites and freely available, has an article on the Personal Health Record with, as of today, 95 links to other sources of information on them, with the most recent cited article being February 2007.
A Chinese version (very abbreviated) of that article is linked there (on the left margin), but there is no Spanish language version given.
An article with the UK viewpoint from the UK's National Health Service titled Personal Health Records and Sharing Patient Information is here, with many good references. Two in particular are these:
Winkleman W, Leonard K & Rossos P. Patient-Perceived Usefulness of Online Electronic Medical Records: Employing Grounded Theory in the Development of Information and Communication Technologies for Use by Patients Living with Chronic Illness. JAMIA Vol. 12, 205:306-314.
and
Winkelman W & Leonard K. Overcoming Structural Constraints to Patient Utilization of Electronic Medical Records: A Critical Review and Proposal for an Evaluation Framework. JAMIA. Vol 11, 2004:151-161.
capstone slide 16
This diagram from Franklin's text book shows the basic parts and connections for a "cruise-control" system, to keep a car moving at a pre-set speed.
It's relevant because the parts and the flow are universal patterns that you can find in almost any system, whether it's man-made or biological or chemical.
The discussion below will start to get way more complicated than is typical for a public health model, but still far less complicated than a typical "control system" problem that engineers solve routinely when, say, designing a new fighter jet.
It doesn't matter that it has many parts and connections, which televisions and cell-phones also do -- it only matters that they number is small enough that the data fit into the computer tool and generate an answer that can then be tested independently. Even three loops, as in the Beer Distribution problem Senge describes in "The Fifth Discipline", is beyond normal human intuition, so beyond that it is pretty much all the same whether the model has 4 loops or 14.
Obviously, for parameter fitting, we want to have a lot more data than unknowns, a constraint that may often be easily met in practice with time-series data. For example, in a year there may be 365 blood glucose readings, which may be rich enough to nail down an 12-parameter model with data to spare.
So, bear with the complications. They turn out not to matter very much.
The picture above shows is a goal, which in the case of a car is the desired speed, shown way at the left of the diagram. This goal goes into the blue box, labelled "controller", which we'll discuss much more shortly. For now, that functions is done by either the computer or the person driving. The controller has something it can control, in the case of a car this is the gas-pedal (throttle). Pushing the pedal down asks the engine to produce more power, which may have some lag time before that takes effect. The power flows into the body of the car, tending to make it go faster, if it weren't for the outside influences that also affect the car, such as whether it is climbing a hill or going down one. The two forces combine to produce one outcome - the actual speed of the car.
The actual speed is perceived by some sensor, such as a speedometer, which also has some distortion and noise affecting it, and possibly some additional lag time. Then the perceived or "Measured" speed is conveyed back to the blue box, the "controller".
At this point, the cycle starts again, but this time with a difference. The controller "knows" what speed it wanted, and can "see" what speed it has achieved, and so it can measure whether it has succeeded in getting the car to go fast enough. The "feedback", by itself, is not positive or negative - it is just information about the car. What the controller does with that information is positive or negative, and is based on an analysis of (a) what the difference is from what was wanted, (b) and how fast the difference is changing or closing the gap.
Part B is really important. If the decision was simply to hold down the gas pedal to the floor until the desired speed was reached, and then release it, the car would overshoot the right speed and be going too fast. Then, if the decision was to slam on the brake until the car slowed down to the right speed, the car would overshoot again, and end up going too slowly. The result would be a rapid cycle of going from too fast to too slow that would never stop.
Not only does the controller have to have some wisdom, it has to have some foresight. If a baseball outfielder's rule was "run towards the ball", as soon as the ball was hit by a batter the outfielder would run towards home plate, where the batter is or just was. Instead, the right thing to do is to run towards "where the ball will come back down, not where it is now."
So, the controller has to decide several things. How far off from the goal is the current outcome? How fast is it catching up? Should something be changed and, if so, which direction?
(For example as it comes up near the correct speed, the gas pedal will have to be let up on slightly, even though the car is still going too slowly!)
It's even worse if the controller had no idea to start with what each of the pedals did, as with a student driver, and had to learn that "pushing the one on the right often makes the car go faster, except going up a steep hill when the car still slows down" and "pushing the one on the left makes the car go slower, except when going down a steep hill when the car may go faster anyway."
Now, add to this the addtional problem that maybe the controller cannot actually see what the ground is doing and has to guess at that as well, based on the response of the car. Finally we have a situation typical for a person learning how to control their blood sugar -- SOMETIMES, eating more carbohydrates helps, but SOMETIMES it doesn't seem to matter, except that SOMETIMES it really makes things worse.
Control System Engineering (CSE) is the study of how such control systems behave, although this is about as simple as one gets, with only one loop in it. Real systems, as are studied in "Systems Thinking" or "Systems Dynamics" have multiple loops that intersect each other, possibly in multiple places. To predict the behavior of those, or to CHANGE their behavior in a desired way without "unintended side-effects", intuition is almost impossible, and some more powerful tool is required.
The issues in designing a control system come down to figuring out what should go into the blue box, the "controller", which is unhelpfully left off entirely from most "feedback diagrams" in the public health or health literature.Fortunately, CSE is well over 100 years old, and has already developed full tool-boxes that do the computational heavy lifting for you, just as products like STATA and SAS and SPSS do the heavy math of statistics for you, so you can just use the results.
Some of the issues that can be solved involve trade-offs in these factors:
Stability: will the overshoots and oscillations calm down over time and go away, or will they actually get worse and worse until something breaks?
Steady state value: if left alone, where will it settle?
Rise time: how fast does the system close the gap between the actual and desired outcomes?
Cost: how much does it cost to make such a system?
Overshoot: how much does the system overshoot the desired value? (Sometimes overshoot is very bad and has to be avoided, as in an example of too high a dose of medicine, in which case the system should come up to the right value slowly from below.)
Disturbance rejection: this is a fancy name for how well the system can maintain a steady value despite changes in the outside world. For a car going 60 miles per hour, for example, it measures how much the speed will change if the car goes down or up a hill.
Response time: How long does it take the controller to figure out that something external has changed and it needs to apply some sort of corrective action?
Lead time and lag time: How long does it take, from the time the gas pedal is pushed, before the engine starts to produce more power? In a small airplane for example, it takes about 4 seconds from the time the throttle is changed until the engine starts delivering more power.
Sensitivity: what happens if the engine gets older, or some days the "oomph" just isn't there, even when the "gas pedal" is pushed? Can the controller adjust for that?
Dynamic tracking: if the goal is changing, how well can the system "keep up" with the ever-changing goal? Can the system deal "if the cheese is moved" or did it only learn one pattern and if the rules change the system will just keep on trying to use the old way to try to cope with a new problem?
With human beings involved, there are some additional variables that are not quite so prevalent in hardware.For one thing, there is a second "motivation" loop that can sag if too little "success" occurs, so it may be necessary to "lower the goal" temporarily to get motivation interested in action again, before raising the goal back up again slowly enough to not lose that sweet relation between the goal and success.
Also, humans have a third loop that can reduce the frustration of conflict between a goal and the actual outcome by changing the sensor - that is, altering their perception of how well they are doing, so that it better matches the goal.
Finally, humans have a fourth loop that can reduce the gap - simply shoot the messenger, or stop going to the doctor. Eliminate the thing that is making that annoying goal show up at all.Too strong a demand and pain related to conflict can result in altering perception, not altering action or actual outcomes.
Of course, exactly the same relief from pressure can be accomplished by letting the feedback loop simply fall apart. Hospitals tend to do that with JCAHO requirements, once JCAHO team leaves. And, patients tend to do that with medical advice.
So, a fifth and sixth loops are needed to capture the external world's pressure and impact, not just on the "body" in question, but directly on the goals, in response to the actions taken (the equivalent of pushing the gas pedal), and onto the ability of the person to perceive what is going on, that is, on their "sensors."
Brief digression for two stories:
A crowd or audience can dramatically shift what can be perceived, something I have first hand knowledge of from doing stage magic in a crowd. Interestingly a crowd of young children is way more perceptive than one child, but a crowd of adults is way less perceptive than any one adult alone, at least when it comes to seeing how a magic trick is "done". In my own experience with such deceptions, a person can see what you have done, then try to tell a neighbor, and if the neighbors all put him down and say "No", he will actually forget entirely that he ever saw the issue in the first place. It's remarkable.
Research on the impact of crowds on individuals has one dramatic video in it that may have been done at Cornell in the late '60s, and was certainly presented by Allan Funt on the TV show "People are Funny." An unwitting subject gets on an elevator on floor 1 of a building going up, and the elevator only has a front door. At each successive floor upwards, an investigator gets on, walks to the back of the elevator, and faces the blank back wall - that clearly cannot possibly open. When the first one does this, our victim glances and ignores it. When the second one does it, he looks somewhat anxiously to see if there is a back door, but decides against it. When the third one does it, the victim simply pivots in place and faces the back wall along with everyone else. The magic number at which people spin around seemed to always be 3.
Returning to the main discussion:
So, we have a tangle of loops that leave the one person and go up to the person's family and friends. Is the problem now hopeless? No, because there is another "break point", after the "single person" break, there is a person and his or her "posse" or "gang" or small group of reference people. This is a cluster of people that are far more interactive with each other than with the outside world, and in some ways a "unit".
In a hospital or health care system, as the IOM report "Crossing the Chasm" points out, there are natural breaks and natural edges to "small care teams" or "microsystems." These are a group of people who collectively deliver care, and who interact far more with each other than they do with the outside world. They are, in a very real sense, a "unit", or "a system", but not just a heap or list of people who communicate - it is far deeper than that. They are directly tied into each other's goal setting, reward system, norm setting, etc. They are directly dependent on each other in a very real way many times a day. They can't get their job done if the other people don't do theirs.
So, the IOM conclusion, demonstrated in many examples, is that this next higher level unit of tangled control loops, the 'small team' or "microsystem" is an even better place to intervene in changing behavior and perception than at the individual level.
It's easier to change a dozen tangled people at once than one person. In fact, there is no way to change "just one person" in such a distributed control system, because the others will restabilize them right back to where they were as soon as you let go.
This is a deep and profound insight. It totally changes how to proceed.
Taken a little further, this suggests that the concept of "a patient" as "an individual" is a broken model. This is certainly true of primates, where there is a saying that "There is no such thing as one chimpanzee." The reason this is true is that a solitary chimp doesn't behave at all the way it will behave in its normal group of chimps. In fact, given the choice of food or a look out a window to see what its herd (?) is doing, even a hungry chimp will select opening the window. Without belonging, there is no point in eating or being alive. It's a chimp level equivalent of cellular apoptosis - where a perfectly healthy "cell", if removed from a human, and subjected to no other stresses, will basically lose the will to live and commit suicide.
Connectivity seems to be some kind of critical factor for humans. Infants that are not touched can simply die. Adults who lose social connectivity have far worse outcomes than those who have not.
The point for us, however, is that the simplest feedback loop is, in reality, a tangle of maybe a dozen or so loops.
This is ok, because no one has to have intuition about the tangle directly, it just has to be small enough that the data can be put into the computer so the computer tools can figure out the simplest feedback loop model that fits the data.This process of "model discovery" is also well known and there are tools for it as well.
However, to my knowledge, no one has ever tried to fit a multi-person dataset using such tools from control system engineering, let alone used the model to design an intervention and deduce, as it were, "where to push" so that the desired outcome will emerge after all the echoes die down.
One more sidebar. Because the purpose of all this system may be to produce a "clamp", that is, to lock an outcome to a particular value (say speed of a car) despite many external changes (hilly terrain), the use of classical statistical reasoning and "causality" breaks down, and process control measures have to be used instead. If the inputs are varying all over the place and the output is constant, classical statistics will say "NOT ASSOCIATED", yet is precisely the role of the 'control system' to BREAK the association between external events and some outcome. The challenge is to spot that two things are unexpectedly NOT associated.
That's more than enough text for one slide.
References will go here, when I have time.
"Systems Thinking" is now part of the 2006 ASPH MPH Curriculum, and was featured in the March, 2006 AJPH issue. Stedman's book "System Dynamics" is certainly enough to intimidate anyone, at 998 pages. See the links in "the law of unintended consequences"
to the MPH curriculum, Stedman, Jay Forrester's classic paper, etc.
capstone slide 17
It is really important to distinguish between analytically solving a problem, and navigating through to a solution.
Academics may attempt to discern what is involved, in the general case, in getting to Safeway to buy groceries, but most of us don't wait for the answer and just go.
This is a problem which can be navigated, even though the solution cannot be well articulated. That such things exist, and are in fact common, is a rather important insight.
In fact, there is no solution to the question "which way do I need to point my car so it will go directly, without changing direction, from the School of Public Health to the Safeway down by the harbor southeast of the Wolfe-street building?"If you seek "an intervention" that will get the car from here to there in "one direction" it will be fruitless. What is needed is a strategy for navigating, and the flexibility to recognize that "driving", like "living" involves many changes in direction. Seeking "one change" that will accomplish a task, on the geographic-direction world, won't work. The change has to be sought on the "how do I navigate?" world.
In the "navigate" world, the answer is easy: "Head south till you can't go south anymore because you'd run into the water, then turn left, keep the water on your immediate right, and go till you get to Safeway. "
What I'm thinking here is that too much expert advice is attempting to give a patient a "single direction solution" when there are no single-direction solutions in the real world, and patients need to be encouraged to open their eyes and steer their own car and not drive into the water.Empowerment is not an "option" -- it is the only way to navigate rough terrain with unknown and unknowable obstacles ahead.
capstone slide 18
Pathmaker software vendor: http://www.skymark.com/
Index to the whole capstone presentation is here.
Link to my entire 1o minute presentation with audio, in powerpoint is here.
capstone slide 20
The University of Michigan Diabetes Center has a diabetes patent empowerment survey instrument, which they say is validated, which can be taken over the web. See Anderson RM, Funnell MM, Fitzgerald JT and Marrero DG, The Diabetes Empowerment Scale: a measure of psychosocial self-efficacy,
Diabetes Care, Vol 23, Issue 6:739-743, 2000 (journal of the American Diabetes Association)
and a letter: Anderson RM et al, The Diabetes Empowerment Scale Short-Form(DES-SF), Diabetes Care 26:1641-1642, 2003.
The Michigan Diabetes Research and Training Center has additional information on this and other survey instruments.
capstone slide 23
37 signals has marvelous products that have received extraordinarily good reviews for being amazingly easy to use. (disclosure: I have no financial association with 37signals - I just love their philosophy and product design!)
You can see the site here
http://www.37signals.com.
Or, if you are at the live presentation, I'll give you a link to my own BaseCamp site and you can check it out directly and play around with it.
From that site, comments I agree with entirely:
94% recommended
In a recent random customer satisfaction survey, 94% of Basecamp
customers and 96% of Backpack customers surveyed said they would recommend
the products to their friends, family, and colleagues. Thanks!
The buzz
We’re fortunate to have the press saying nice things about us. Basecamp received a BusinessWeek Best of the Web award in 2005 and 2006. A PC World review called Backpack “Tremendous.” [see the blue box] Time Magazine named us one of the Net's rising stars.Business Week is quoted in the BaseCamp specific page as follows:
“Basecamp is so simple you can't do anything wrong. It's addictively easy-to-use.”-Robert Hof, BusinessWeek
And - a simpler user version of all the products is zero cost, free. And, even if you want to upgrade because you're hooked, there is no set-up cost, it's billed month-to-month, and there's no termination cost. That's about as good as it gets.
I wrote an entire paper on how 37signals tools would be useful for Disaster Preparedness, that I may put on-line soon.
Saturday, April 21, 2007
REACH Detroit , a CDC project
So, I was discussing my 1-day-old Johns Hopkins MPH Capstone project with Bree, and she said, oh yes, she'd worked with the "REACH Detroit" group, sponsored by the CDC, as part of her MPH work at UM/SPH. So I came home and found REACH Detroit Partnership.
(to the left is a picture of my wife Cheryll holding Bree's new daughter.)
REACH, by the way, turns out to mean: Racial and Ethnic Approaches to Community Life.
See this on the REACH 2005 Community Report (in English) for Detroit
which me refers to Dr. Michele Heisler's work, as in:
Heisler, M., Piette, J., Spencer, M. S., Kieffer, E., & Vijan, S. (2005). The relationship between knowledge of recent hemoglobin A1c values and diabetes care understanding and self-management. Diabetes Care, 28, 816-822.
Michael S. Spenser, UMich School of Social Work.
Spencer, M. S., & Chen, J. (2004). Discrimination and mental health service use
Dr. Jackie Two Feathers (see cite further below)
Dr. Edie Kieffer "Reducing Disparities in Diabetes Among African-American and Latino Residents in Detroit: The Essential Role of Community Planning Focus Groups", in Ethnicity and Disease
It may be that Edie Kieffer was or is the PI of the project.
The CDC National site on REACH has links to others of the 24 cities involved and a map.
and links to funding announcements (looks like a Cooperative Research).
THE Detroit site lists other articles (go there for actual working links)
- Two Feathers, J., Kieffer, E.C., Palmisano, G., Anderson, M., Janz, N.K., Spencer, M., Guzman, R., James, S.A.
The Development, Implementation and Process Evaluation of the REACH Detroit Partnership’s Diabetes Lifestyle Intervention.
Accepted for publication in "The Diabetes Educator" in 2/2007. - Kim, C, Kieffer, E.C., Sinco, B.R. Racial and Ethnic Variation in Access to Healthcare,
Provision of Healthcare Services, and Ratings of Health Among Women with a History of Gestational Diabetes Mellitus.
Accepted for publication in Diabetes Care in 3/2007. - Kieffer, E. C., Tabaei, B. P., Carman, W. J., Nolan, G. H., Guzman, J. R., and Herman, W. H.
The Influence of Maternal Weight and Glucose Tolerance on Infant Birth Weight in Latino Mother–Infant Pairs.
American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 96. No. 12: 2201-2208, 2006. - Kieffer E, Sinco B, Kim C.
Health Behaviors Among Women of Reproductive Age With and Without a History of Gestational Diabetes Mellitus.
Diabetes Care; 29: 1788 - 1793; 2006. - Kieffer E, Sinco B, Rafferty A, Spencer M, Palmisano G, Watt E, Heisler M.
Chronic Disease-Related Behaviors and Health among African Americans and Hispanics in the REACH Detroit 2010 Communities, Michigan, and the United States.
Health Promotion Practice; 7(3) [Suppl.1] 256S - 264S; 2006. - Spencer M, Kieffer E, Sinco B, Palmisano G, Guzman R, James S, Graddy-Dansby G, Two Feathers J, Heisler M.
Diabetes-Specific Emotional Distress among African Americans and Hispanics with Type 2 Diabetes.
Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved; 17:88-105; 2006. - Two Feathers, J., Kieffer, E., Guzman R, Palmisano G., Heisler M. Anderson, M., Sinco, B., Wisdom K., James, S.
Racial and Ethnic Approaches to Community Health (REACH) Detroit Partnership: Improving Diabetes-related Outcomes among African American and Latino Adults.
American Journal of Public Health.95(9):1552-1560; 2005. - Heisler M, Piette J, Spencer M, Kieffer E, Vijan S.
The relationship between knowledge of recent hemoglobin A1c values and diabetes care understanding and self-management.
Diabetes Care;28(4):816-822;2005. - Book Chapter: Kieffer E, SalabarrÃa-Peña Y, Odoms-Young A, Willis S, Baber K, Guzman R. The Application of Focus Group Methodologies to Community-Based Participatory Research. In Israel B. et al. (Eds.) Methods for Conducting Community-Based Participatory Research in Public Health. Jossey-Bass, 2005.
- Kieffer E, Willis S, Odoms-Young A, Guzman R, Allen A, Two Feathers J, Loveluck J.
Reducing Disparities in Diabetes among African American and Latino Residents of Detroit: The Essential Role of Community Planning Focus Groups.
Ethnicity and Disease;14(3) [Suppl.1] S1-27-S1-37; 2004.
Sunday, April 01, 2007
Key findings from public health
Healthy "people" aren't localized rocks, but are normally well-interconnected bidirectionally into the social fabric around them.
Social connectivity is the most robust predictor of internal, "physiological", "biomedical" outcomes, such as morbidity, mortality, survival rate of surgery, resistance to infection, level of depression, outcome of diabetes, obesity, "mental" health, you name it.
Prevention is a thousand times more cost effective than repair. ( A lesson from software engineering and many other fields as well.)
The caring human loving touch of another individual is very important to human health and healing. Infants who aren't touched do poorly or simply die.
All interesting social phenomena (such as relationships, jobs, teams, family, stress, love, sex, the economy, depression) involve intimately bidirectional feedback loops.
But, classical statistical measures and attitudes, based on prediction of yields of crops, assume critically that causality is defined in one direction only, and that all phenomena of interest can be "isolated" from context and one part of it varied by the experimenter while other parts of it are "held constant." None of that applies to "complex adaptive systems", including social systems, which are inextricably interconnected, context-dependent, interdependent, and riddled with bidirectional feedback loops. Since the tools and expertise breakdown when applied to these areas, rather than admit that the tools and expertise are inadequate, the problem space is instead defined as "non-scientific" or "soft-science" and demeaned as unimportant or "non-scientific."
Possibly due to such schizophenia, the US "healthcare" system behaves as if none of the above solid empirical facts were known. There is no focus on social connectivity, less than 2% of the budget is spent on prevention, and machines and processes have replaced people at the bedside. People are treated like machines, and diseases are treated as if they were independent of each other and the rest of peoples lives. "People" are reduced to "patients". "Caregivers" are too busy to stay and chat for a while with "patients" and are increasing renamed "providers" which is ironic, since mostly they consume resources, particularly money, while being forced by "the system" to be too busy to stick around and observe the actual outcomes of their "treatments" on the people they serve. It's a lose-lose scenario, disliked by the patients, disliked by the caregivers, and apparently continues to exist because it's loved by the insurance companies. The whole thing needs to be rethought based on the above new facts of life.
Perhaps, not surprisingly then, the outcomes of the US Healthcare system are terrible, compared to peer countries. Infant mortality is something like 19th in the world. Costs are huge but a recent study showed that the BEST quartile of US citizens (the rich) have health outcomes worse than the WORST quartile of British citizens in the UK. (ref ?). Depression, obesity, diabetes are widespread and rampant epidemics in the US.
But, efforts to build healthcare interventions that are designed around social connectivity and whole persons are demeaned and ridiculed as being "non-scientific", or avoided because the feedback loops make computing "p-values" problematic for academic researchers, for whom such mathematical bases for certainty are held with a sort of blind obsession despite the fact that the assumptions of the theory (General Linear Model) don't fit the problem they're trying to address.
The result is that the most effective interventions are known, and involve teams of people assisting individual humans to modify or control their behavior and life style, but the advocates of these interventions are academically shunned and have to present their work in embarrassment in back rooms. The Office of Behavioral and Social Science Research (OBSSR) within NIH is treated like an awkward in-law.
Probably the single best book that summarizes interventions in health care that actually work is Health Program Planning : An Educational and Ecological Approach by Lawrence W. Green and Marshall W. Kreuter, now in it's fourth edition. (c) 2005 McGraw Hill, initial version written in 1961. It was around that year that non-communicable diseases began to replace communicable diseases as the leading causes of death, disability, and impaired quality of life, but the older, biomedical model had a very tightly held death-grip on the "health care industry."
On page 3 of that book the authors note:
Ecological approaches have proven difficult to evaluate because the units of analysis do not lend themselves to rand assignment, experimental control, and manipulating characteristic of preferred scientific approaches to establishing causation. Although the linear isolatable cause-effect model of scientific problem solving remains the point of departure for the training of health professionals, practitioners find ... they cannot ignore the contextual reality that health status is unquestionably influenced by an immensely complex ecological system. ...The primary tools up to this task are described by John Sterman in his tome Business Dynamics, 999 pages in length. The simpler techniques of mapping on a white-board is known as Causal-Loop Diagramming or CLD. These qualitative webs can be assigned some semi-quantitative values, such as directionality and general magnitude (large, small, strong, weak) and then simulated using tools such as Vensim (tm).
To address those systems in our planning, we must first be able to see them ...
By definition, ecological sub-systems do not operate in isolation from one another ... [but] interact with one another to influence health. [We need] a kind of ecological map or "web" or "systems model" enabling us to visualize the network of relationships that need to be taken into account as we plan our intervention strategy tailored to the unique circumstances of the target population and the place where they live and work.
That, however, is a lot of work. "Systems thinking" didn't show up in the MPH curriculum until 2006, and is absent, by that name, in most courses, even at leading universities. Only MIT and Worcester Polytechnic Institute seem to have embraced these tools, although the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan is starting to build a systems thinking program after the auto industry started demanding it.
Note that the pressure for innovation here is from business, and the academics are lagging behind, sometimes kicking and screaming, in stage 2 of Schopenhauer's three stages:
All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
Arthur Schopenhauer
So, this pretty much summarizes the state of affairs today. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health has started a new department of Health Behavior along the lines of the new theory, but most health and public health people are famously non-quantitative, and so they are attempting to think through such problems mentally, unassisted by available tools used in other industries for over 50 years now in systems dynamics.
And, the biomedical establishment has a strong lock on most thinking and peer-review journals, and alternates denial and violent opposition to the "new paradigm" which it perceives as a throwback to mystical soft thinking instead of a more general version of the scientific method that can embrace feedback loops and complex adaptive systems without distortion of the tools or violation of the assumptions behind the models and statistics.
Even at Hopkins in the department of Epidemiology, the ratio of new thinkers to old-paradigm thinkers is essentially 3 to 70, and this new paradigm is ridiculed, rejected, opposed, despised, by most old-school thinkers who wish the answer to health had stayed down the microscope, under control, where they had strong muscles and good intuition - instead of showing up increasingly outside the window of the lab, in the social fabric of society, in all the places the scientists grew up despising and where their tools and muscles and intuition all fail.
So, where does that leave us humans?
Apparently, we can't expect either academics or health care workers to take the lead in fixing this terrible mess, and business is going to have to get down to business and do something about it.(This is not without precedent - the center of innovation in the USA has increasingly moved out of universities and into businesses, despite the very strong marketing campaign with the opposite message. Witness the pulling-teeth it's taken to get systems thinking into the Ross Business School curriculum.)
Business today is much more cybernetic on a real-time basis than academia, and utilizes "good enough" models which, with cybernetic feedback control, get the job done and produce the desired outcomes - - while driving academics crazy because the underlying models are "so bad."
The National Institutes of Health is still heavily dominated as well by biomedically oriented researchers of the old school, who resist the new paradigm.
So, with a few exceptions, industry money may be the only way to advance health care in serious ways, and address the findings at the top of this post sometime this century when we're still alive to care about it.
We have, as in so many of M.C. Escher's paintings, (see this link:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Escher_Waterfall.jpg
created a world that is locally-sensible and globally nonsense, but few people working locally are motivated to address the global wrongness, and no Masters or PhD student or young researcher would be encouraged to tackle a "large" problem, and so it sits there, unaddressed by academia and a thorn in the side of everyone: patients, doctors, nurses, payers, industry.
Like Escher's paintings, one is hard pressed to see or point to exactly "where" the wrongness is, and yet, standing back, it's clearly wrong.
That's where things are today.
[ M.C. Escher website: http://www.mcescher.com/ ]