The New York Times editorial today rejoices in the new US Army Field manual, whicih would be the new version of FM 3-0 Ground Operations. A key to Army field manuals follows below.
While I agree with the Times that there was, indeed, a catastrophic planning failure, I think it is worth while backing up further upstream and asking how on earth that could have happened.
The real issue here isn't whether the Army knew what to do, but what the Army should do when it tries to do what it should and the civilian leadership refuses to listen to the discussion and doesn't want to listen to inconvenient facts.
This gets into the subject of High Reliability Organizations, Safety Cultures, and the
US Army Leadership Field Manual FM 22-100, previously discussed here.
Here's a glimpse into the articles and source documents. I was unable to find a copy of the new, revised, draft FM 3-0 online for the general public at this time.
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The New York Times, Op Ed
Nov 26, 2006
While politicians from both parties spin out their versions of Iraqs that should have been, could have been and just maybe still might be, the Army has taken on a far more useful project: figuring out why the Bush administration’s military plans worked out so badly and drawing lessons for future conflicts.
...Two hopeful examples are the latest draft of a new Army field manual ...Last week, The Los Angeles Times published details of some of the major changes being incorporated into the new field manual, while The Washington Post reported on some of the lessons learned in the Iraqi training programs.
The field manual, the Army’s basic guidebook for war, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, quietly jettisons the single most disastrous innovation of the Rumsfeld era. That is the misconceived notion that the size and composition of an American intervention force should be based only on what is needed to defeat the organized armed forces of an enemy government, instead of also taking into account the needs of providing security and stability for the civilian population for which the United States will then be responsible.
Almost every post-invasion problem in Iraq can be directly traced to this one catastrophic planning failure, which left too few troops in Iraq to prevent rampant looting, restore basic services and move decisively against the insurgency before it took root and spread.
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What are Army Field Manuals? (From Slate Nov 16, 2006)
FMs—for just about everything a member of the Army might need to do,from handling nuclear material to cooking dinner. As of a few yearsago, there were over 650 different manuals. Some cover broad topics(for instance, FM 1 "The Army," and FM 3-0 "Operations") while others focus on more specific issues—like FM 8-50,"Prevention and Medical Management of Laser Injuries." The standardfield manual is written at a sixth-grade level and broken intochapters, and adorned with charts, tables, and hand-drawnillustrations. Some of the books come with appendices of examples orreal-life vignettes. Many—but not all—of them are available to thepublic on Web sites like this one.
Commentary
Officer of Engineers
02-09-2004, 02:29 AM
...FM 3.0 - OPERATIONS (...)- By far, this is the most important document in the USArmy. It detailsthe strategic intent. Without this document as a reference, the rest of thearticles would be of little use.
FT. LEAVENWORTH, KAN. — Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld may be leaving under a cloud of criticism over his handling of the Iraq war, but his invasion plan — emphasizing speed over massive troop numbers — has consistently been held up as a resounding success.
Yet with Iraq near chaos 3 1/2 years later, a key Army manual now is being rewritten in a way that rejects the Rumsfeld doctrine and counsels against using it again.The draft version of the Army's Full Spectrum Operations field manual argues that in addition to defeating the enemy, military units must focus on providing security for the population — even during major combat.
TRADOC- Army Training and Doctrine Command
FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. (TRADOC News Service, August 25, 2006) -- In future conflicts, the United States will continue to face adversaries who use asymmetric approaches to warfare.
Col. Bob Johnson, chief of the Future Warfare Division Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate at Fort Monroe, Va., made this point at the Training and Doctrine Command Doctrine and Concept Conference II Aug. 16-17 at Fort Leavenworth.
The purpose of the conference was to discuss outstanding issues in Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations: Full Spectrum Operations, which is being revised, and to look at future operational and tactical maneuver operating concepts, said Lt. Col. Jeff La Face, division chief for the Operational Level Doctrine, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, here.
Full spectrum operations refer to simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability operations and civil support. FM 3-0 covers the fundamentals and principles that the Army uses in today's military operations, said La Face, whose CADD team is revising the manual
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This is a great question, but the answer may require a few years of preparation. We may find it helpful to learn how to carry on such conversations on less-loaded topics first.
For example, people have studied recent disasters at nuclear power plants, space shuttles, airplane accidents, etc., to see how on earth these things happen, despite our best efforts to make them safe. The answers reveal a lot about how humans form beliefs, carry on conversations, and change beliefs. The stakes keep getting higher.
The keys to what's called "high reliability organizations" are honesty, trust, and ability to speak out respectfully and safely when you see something that doesn't seem to fit the story that everyone is treating as truth. And that means sometimes not only questioning the fact, but also questioning the framework or model or story-line.
The costs of mistakes keep getting higher, so this is a type of social learning that gets more important with time. This kind of problem occurs at home, at work, and at a national and cultural level.
It's hard, but not impossible, to build such a "safety culture" on purpose. All high-risk businesses are working on that problem, including nuclear power plants, airlines, hospitals.. It's made doubly-hard because we tangle up questioning facts, questioning assumptions, and challenging-authority or "stepping out of line." So, those who raise honest questions in a loving way are often perceived as opponents or enemies.
Some people still assert that dissent and open questioning are not compatible with the necessary authority and control to maintain law, order, and public safety. The facts disagree. In aircraft cockpits, co-pilots are learning how to challenge the pilot's facts without challenging her authority. In hospitals, nurses are learning how to challenge the surgeon's assumptions without being out of line. Even the US Army has a program of learning how those on "the bottom" can question the facts and assumptions of those above them without being insubordinate. If these questions can't be raised, overall safety goes down, not up, and that's been demonstrated over and over.
And, particularly, the hardest thing to do is to challenge unspoken, shared assumptions.
But, until we learn how to carry on these conversations, about the "truth" of much simpler things such as what's going on inside the reactor, or on that left wing, or inside the patient, or in the middle east, it seems doubly hard to talk about differing assumptions regarding religious questions.
So it's a really good sign that people are learning how to carry on serious conversations, and that a lot of funding is going into that activity. Those skills should help give us the experience and skills we need to tackle even harder questions about apparent discrepancies between religions, and between religion and science.
On the other hand, if we can't even carry on productive conversations about relatively simple matters, we shouldn't be surprised that the harder ones defy us.
November 19, 2006 6:39 AM